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FINDING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
ANTITRUST CLAIMS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
ORIGIN: WHETHER THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
APPROACH PROPERLY BALANCES POLICIES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMITY AND DETERRENCE
INTRODUCTION
Application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct involves a bat-
tle between deterrence of wrongful conduct and respect for the sover-
eignty of foreign governments, generally described as international
comity. Applying antitrust law to foreign conduct relies on a
profound desire to excise unfair commercial practices that impact U.S.
markets. Where U.S. markets are unaffected, application of U.S. law
to conduct abroad destabilizes ties with foreign countries and under-
mines successful export commerce. Such concerns were manifested in
federal legislation such as the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982 (FTAIA).' The FTAIA requires that for conduct abroad
to be actionable in U.S. courts, it must (1) have "a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce; and (2) "give[]
rise to a claim."'2 Under the FTAIA's second prong, three federal cir-
cuits apply conflicting meanings of "a claim."'3 Does "a claim" mean a
domestic claim generally, the plaintiff's actual claim, or a hypothetical
claim? Recently, in Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 4 the
Supreme Court resolved this circuit split, holding that "a claim"
means the plaintiff's claim, the most restrictive of the three interpreta-
tions.5 By requiring courts to find that the requisite effects on U.S.
commerce exist. before asserting jurisdiction over these claims, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United
1. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
2. Id.
3. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated by
124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Den Norske
Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). According to one commen-
tator, the Federal Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), when considered "[als
an attempt to clarify the intended scope of the antitrust laws with regard to foreign trade...
must be viewed as a failure." Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2122, 2136 (2001).
4. 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
5. Id. at 2372.
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Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co. 6 created newfound ambigu-
ity in interpreting the FTAIA's first prong.7
In interpreting the FTAIA, federal courts implicitly balance policies
of international comity and deterrence. Empagran and earlier federal
court opinions forms the backdrop for how this Note analyzes United
Phosphorus-a decision that will alter the manner in which FTAIA
claims are heard and ultimately will restrict the number of actions
brought before U.S. courts. This Note argues that the Seventh Cir-
cuit's interpretation, while properly recognizing international comity,
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and ignores an integral anti-
trust policy-deterrence. 8
Part II of this Note discusses the Sherman Act of 1890 (Sherman
Act) and judicial approaches to the "extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law"9 prior to passage of the FTAIA. 10 Part II then
details the FTAIA and Supreme Court decisional law. 1 Part III high-
lights the views expressed by the majority and dissenting opinions in
United Phosphorus.12 Part IV criticizes the United Phosphorus major-
ity opinion and supports the dissenting opinion from textual, prece-
dential, and legislative history perspectives. 13 Part V discusses the
various arguments from federal circuit dissenting opinions and other
commentators that discuss deterrence, which is the policy United
Phosphorus undervalues. 14 Part VI concludes that United Phosphorus
will undermine U.S. antitrust enforcement and weaken the deterrence
of anticompetitive conduct.' 5
6. 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
7. Id. (interpreting FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)).
8. Id. at 952.
9. See Note, supra note 3, at 2128; Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterrito-
rial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law: What Is A "Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foresee-
able Effect" Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements. Act?, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 11, 11
(2003); David V. Dzara, Note, Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof: Interpreting
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act to Determine Whether "A Claim" Means "The
Claim", 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 411, 413 (2003); Ryan A. Haas, Comment, Act Locally,
Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from International Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust
Law Globally, 15 Lo'. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 101 (2003); Kareen O'Brien, Comment, Giving
Rise to a Claim: Is FTAIA's Section 6A(2) an Antitrust Plaintiffs Key to the Courthouse Door?, 9
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 421, 455 (2003); William J. Tuttle, The Return of Timberlane?: The Fifth
Circuit Signals a Return to Restrictive Notions of Extraterritorial Antitrust, 36 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 319, 321 (2003).
10. See infra notes 16-46 and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000); see infra notes 47-124 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 125-214 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 215-308 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 309-356 and accompanying text. This section also discusses arguments that
caution against overly broad application of U.S. jurisdiction abroad.
15. See infra notes 357-358 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW BEFORE AND
AFTER PASSAGE OF THE FTAIA
Before and after passage of the FIAIA, courts have struggled to
harmonize the at-times conflicting policies of deterring wrongful con-
duct, encouraging U.S. export business, 16 and granting comity to for-
eign sovereigns. Although not interpreting the FTAIA, the Supreme
Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California implicitly narrowed
the scope and, consequently, the importance of international comity
concerns in its discussion of whether to apply U.S. antitrust law to
foreign conduct.17 By logical extension, Hartford's minimization of in-
ternational comity gave the Sherman Act broad application over al-
leged foreign antitrust wrongdoing.18 Yet, in F. Hoffnan-La Roche v.
Empagran S.A., the Supreme Court retreated from this position by
finding that international comity tempered statutory construction in
its consequent holding that the "effects on U.S. commerce" 19 from
foreign conduct must give rise to the plaintiff's claim.20 Empagran
arguably breathes life into the importance of international comity with
this interpretation of the FTAIA. Accordingly, Empagran, decided
after United Phosphorus, buttresses United Phosphorus's emphasis on
international comity in its interpretation of the FTAIA. The notion
that the FTAIA "restrict[s] the subject matter jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts" and is not an "element of the plaintiff's claim" is also
validated in United Phosphorus.2' The United Phosphorus dissent,
however, raises searing points that question the rationale and worka-
bility of the majority's approach despite its timely, comity-stressed
analysis. 22
16. This Note will focus on the policies of international comity and deterrence but will not
discuss in detail encouraging U.S. export activity, "however anticompetitive." F. Hoffman-La
Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2364 (2004). Unlike the former two policies, this
latter policy is uncontroversial and accepted as a major motivation for passage of the FTAIA.
See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 1-3, 9-10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2487-88, 2494-95).
17. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993).
18. Id.
19. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003).
20. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2359.
21. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 953.
22. Id. at 954 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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A. The Foundation of U.S. Statutory Antitrust Law
and Underlying Policies
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes. ' 23 Pursuant to that authority, Congress enacted the Sher-
man Act, which largely codified "common law condemnation of
monopolization and [other] restraints of trade. n24 Pursuant to Section
1 of the Sherman Act, "every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."'25 Section 2 criminalizes monopolization and "attempt[s] to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations. '26
The Sherman Act originally failed to provide a cause of action for
individuals to sue alleged wrongdoers. 27 The Clayton Act of 1914
(Clayton Act) filled that gap, providing that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States. ' 28 The Clayton Act also provides successful complainants "in-
junctive relief or treble damages plus costs and attorney's fees. '29
Although the Sherman Act seeks to maintain efficient market per-
formance, courts and scholars interpret its underlying policies to be
abstract economic goals of equilibrium market performance. 30 Ac-
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. See Note, supra note 3, at 2124 n.18 ("The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the
United States to apply the same remedies against combinations ... that have been applied in the
several States to protect local interests." (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen.
Sherman))).
25. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Note, supra note 3, at 2124.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Describing the Attorney General's power to prosecute violations under the
Act, author William Tuttle writes:
The U.S. Attorney's office may prosecute violations of the Sherman Act in either a civil
or criminal proceeding. If the government directly purchased goods from the party
accused of antitrust violations, it may obtain injunctive relief, damages, or both through
a civil proceeding. Alternatively, the government may prosecute all antitrust violations
and seek imprisonment and fines of up to ten million dollars.
Tuttle, supra note 9, at 328.
27. Tuttle, supra note 9, at 328; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000); see also Tuttle, supra note 9, at 328.
29. Tuttle, supra note 9, at 328; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
30. One author argued that antitrust laws serve joint goals of compensating injured parties
and deterring anticompetitive behavior. Haas, supra note 9, at 102-03. Another author de-
scribed the egalitarian purpose underlying the Sherman Act: "In safeguarding rights of the 'com-
mon man' in business 'equal' to those of the evolving more 'ruthless' and impersonal forms of
enterprise the Sherman Act embodies what is to be characterized as an eminently 'social pur-
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cording to case law, the Sherman Act is intended to accomplish more
than the realization of economic principles. 31 As one author stated,
"Not only do the antitrust laws purportedly yield the most efficient
allocation of economic resources, producing both the lowest possible
prices and the highest quality for the greatest number, they simultane-
ously 'provide an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic[,] political[,] and social institutions.' "32
B. Early Court "Tests" Applying U.S. Antitrust Law over Foreign
Conduct: Movement from a Strict Territorial Approach to
an "Effects on U.S. Commerce" Analysis
Courts were originally reticent to apply U.S. antitrust law to foreign
conduct because the Sherman Act was understood as limited to con-
duct within the territorial borders of the United States. 33 The Su-
preme Court articulated the "strict territorial" approach in applying
the Sherman Act to foreign conduct, 34 as typified by the analysis in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 3 5 American Banana Com-
pany (American Banana) sued United Fruit Company (United Fruit)
alleging that United Fruit had convinced the Costa Rican government
to appropriate land needed by American Banana, its competitor, to
distribute fruit.36 Finding that such alleged conduct occurred entirely
in Central America, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that "the
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the coun-
try where the act is done."'37 Justice Holmes also emphasized the im-
pose."' Note, supra note 3, at 2125 (quoting HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1954)). Even Senator Sherman, to
whom Judge Hand turned for interpretive guidance, characterized the act as "a desire to put an
end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them."
Note, supra note 3, at 2125 n.21 (quoting HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POL-
ICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1954)).
31. One commentator argued:
In one of the most famous opinions construing the Sherman Act, Judge Learned Hand
gave voice to the popular sentiment many have viewed as the animating philosophy of
the antitrust laws-that industrial consolidation and the concomitant accretions of
power are "inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results."
Note, supra note 3, at 2125 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.
(Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945)).
32. See id. at 2125 (alteration in original) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958)).
33. See Tuttle, supra note 9, at 328.
34. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9, at 12 (quoting A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2 ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1010-17 (4th ed. 1997)).
35. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
36. Id. at 355-57.
37. Id. at 356; see also Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9, at 13.
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portance of international comity, "which precludes U.S. courts from
imposing judgments on the decisions of foreign governments. ' 38
However, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), the
Second Circuit developed one of the first "effects tests," eliminating
the strict territorial approach implicit in American Banana.39 Al-
though the Sherman Act imposed no liability where no effects from
wrongful conduct occurred in the United States, the court held that
"any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its al-
legiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends. ' '40 Thus, any wrongdoing was
"intended to affect imports and did affect them. ' 41 Thus, the location
of the effects and not of the wrongdoing controlled whether U.S. anti-
trust laws applied.42 In retrospect, Alcoa was difficult to apply since
such terms as "effect" and "intent" were unspecified. 43 Alcoa also
failed to consider international comity. 44
Following Alcoa were court decisions that varied the "effects"
theme. For instance, the Ninth Circuit employed an "interest-balanc-
ing" methodology in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,45
which accounted for international comity. But not all circuits fol-
lowed suit. The Second Circuit disagreed with the Timberlane ap-
proach and continued to apply an effects-oriented analysis. 46
38. See Haas, supra note 9, at 103 (discussing Justice Holmes's opinion); see also Tuttle, supra
note 9, at 330-31. Black's Law Dictionary defines "comity" as "courtesy among political entities
(as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legis-
lative, executive, and judicial acts." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 213 (7th ed. 2000); see also Haas,
supra note 9, at 103 n.31. One author suggests that Justice Holmes gave an interpretation of U.S.
antitrust laws precluding application of U.S. antitrust authority abroad "regardless of the nature
and degree of domestic effects." See Tuttle, supra note 9, at 330.
39. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945); see
also Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9, at 13.
40. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 444.
42. See Haas, supra note 9, at 104 (citing Spencer Webber Waller, The U.S. as Antitrust Court-
room to the World: Jurisdiction and Standing Issues in Transnational Litigation, 14 Loy. CON-
SUMER L. REV. 523, 525 (2002)); see also sources cited supra note 9.
43. See Haas, supra note 9, at 104; see also Dzara, supra note 9, at 414-15.
44. See Tuttle, supra note 9, at 334.
45. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally
Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9.
46. Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
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C. The FTAIA's Attempt to "Clarify" the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law
In 1982, Congress strove to resolve differences among the federal
circuits in applying U.S. antitrust law to matters abroad.47 Thus, Con-
gress amended the Sherman Act by passing the FTAIA.48 The
FTAIA provides:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with for-
eign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce
with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the
United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of section 1
to 7 of this title, other than this section.
49
Congress intended the FTAIA to keep courts from invoking U.S.
subject matter jurisdiction to protect foreign companies where the
requisite "effects" on U.S. commerce were lacking.50 Conversely,
Congress also exempted certain exporters from the Act's scope in an
effort to aid U.S. export markets. 51 Additionally, noncitizens were
not expressly denied the right to commence suit, implying that Con-
gress intended that foreign plaintiffs could seek redress in U.S. courts
even if the alleged conduct occurred overseas. 52 Although the
FTAIA's drafters aspired to create a clearer test for applying U.S. an-
titrust law abroad, 53 commentators conclude that due to poor phras-
ing,54 the statute has created more confusion.
55
47. See Haas, supra note 9, at 105.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
49. Id. § 402.
50. Tuttle, supra note 9, at 345.
51. See Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9, at 13. The FTAIA states: "It is the purpose of this
chapter to increase United States exports of products and services by encouraging more efficient
provision of export trade services to United States producers and suppliers ... by modifying the
application of the antitrust laws to certain export trade." 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2000). One com-
mentator, however, argues that "Congress' ambiguous wording has led to the abandonment of
the FTAIA's original goal of excluding some U.S. exporters from the restrictions of the Sherman
Act. Tuttle, supra note 9, at 346-47. This deviation has led the FTAIA to be used as support for
the Timberlane progeny and its considerations of international comity." Id. at 346.
52. See Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9, at 29.
53. See id. at 345 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, 97th Cong. at 2, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2487).
54. Attorneys Beckler and Kirtland provide a helpful, clarified rendition of the statute:
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D. Supreme Court Case Law in the FTAIA Era: The Increased
Emphasis on International Comity in Finding U.S.
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Conduct
U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with the FTAIA illustrate a
shifting policy towards giving greater weight to international comity
concerns in deciding whether to apply U.S. jurisdiction to alleged an-
ticompetitive conduct overseas. In Hartford, the Court held that in-
ternational comity concerns are relevant in only a narrow subset of
circumstances, 56 but the Court's opinion in Empagran suggests a sig-
nificant change of course. 57
1. Hartford Minimizes the Role of International Comity in
Applying U.S. Antitrust Law Abroad
In 1993, the Supreme Court gave what many considered a "near
death blow" 58 to international comity in applying U.S. antitrust juris-
diction abroad. 59 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant insurance
companies conspired to restrict the availability and provisions of
"commercial general liability insurance available in the United States"
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.60 Some of the defend-
ants, London-based insurers, moved to dismiss on international com-
While the language of the FTAIA is somewhat clumsy, it boils down to the idea that
the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct involving non-import foreign commerce
unless the conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
either:
(1) domestic commerce, such as extraterritorial conduct or foreign agreements having
the effect of raising prices that U.S. consumers must pay for products in the United
States;
(2) non-direct import commerce, such as inflated prices for foreign products that reach
the U.S. market through any mechanism other than direct sales; or
(3) export trade or commerce of a U.S. company, such as foreign agreements that re-
strict or eliminate U.S. exports to a given market.
Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 9, at 14.
55. The framers of the FTAIA failed to define a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able" effect. See Tuttle, supra note 9, at 345-46 (citations omitted). Further, "what degree of
effects on U.S. exporters is sufficient to trigger U.S. jurisdiction" was not provided for in the
statute. Id. (citing Jeffrey N. Neuman, Comment, Through a Glass Darkly: The Case Against
Pilkington Plc. Under the New U.S. Department of Justice International Enforcement Policy, 16
N.W. J. INT'L L. Bus. 284, 299 (1995).
56. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 (1993).
57. See generally F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
58. See Haas, supra note 9, at 106 (citing Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 564-69 (2000)).
59. See Haas, supra note 9, at 106 (discussing the impact of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Califor-
nia, 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993), on international comity concerns in determining whether to apply
U.S. jurisdiction to alleged conduct occurring overseas).
60. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993).
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ity grounds,61 based on express British Parliamentary approval of
their activity.62 But Justice David Souter, writing for the majority, re-
jected the defendants' arguments. 63 First, the Court held that the
Sherman Act applies to conduct intended to cause, that does cause,
effects on U.S. trade.64 The plaintiff's complaint met this standard.
65
Second, the Court explained that international comity plays a role in
the Court's analysis only if there is a direct conflict of laws. 66 Merely
because Parliament condoned, or even encouraged, the defendants'
activities did not mean that the defendants need not comply with both
laws. 67 Justice Souter reasoned, "Where a person who is subject to
regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both," there is no
conflict, and international comity is irrelevant.
68
In his dissenting opinion,69 Justice Antonin Scalia treated the ques-
tion as one of congressional intent, not as one of jurisdiction. 70 With-
out an indication from Congress to the contrary, federal legislation
applies only over American soil.71 First, he argued that without con-
trary congressional intent, federal legislation applies only over U.S.
territorial jurisdiction. 72 Furthermore, "[laws] ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains. '73 According to Justice Scalia, the majority's result created a
"sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other
countries."74
Hartford's "true conflict" 75  of laws approach vitiated the
Timberlane76 interest-balancing approach.77 This result highlighted an
61. Id.
62. Id. at 798.
63. Id. at 799.
64. Id. at 796.
65. Id.
66. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 798-99.
67. Id. at 799.
68. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987)).
69. Id. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia considered the issues of subject matter jurisdic-
tion and the application of the FTAIA as "two distinct questions." Id. at 812-13 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
71. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 820 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 798-99.
76. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
77. See Tuttle, supra note 9, at 350-51 (citing Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global
Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 678 (2001)).
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extremely narrow view of conflicts of laws and permitted expansive
application of U.S. antitrust law.78
2. Empagran Retreats from Hartford by Increasing the Importance
of International Comity in Its Statutory Construction
of the FTAIA
As discussed earlier, there were three conflicting interpretations
among the federal circuits about what gives rise to "a claim" under the
second prong of the FTAIA. Each circuit opinion is important in that
each gives varying emphasis to international comity in deciding what
"a claim" means. Eventually, the Supreme Court settled the matter,
giving international comity an important role in its analysis by adopt-
ing the most restrictive of the three circuit approaches.
a. Preamble to Empagran: Three Federal Circuits Disagree over
What "Gives Rise to 'A' Claim"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Sec-
ond Circuit, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia all disagreed over interpreting the meaning of "a claim."
Recall that the FTAIA provides that the Sherman Act will not apply
to foreign conduct with foreign nations unless the following occurs:
"(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect" on U.S. commerce; and (2) "such effect gives rise to a claim
under the" Sherman Act. 79 Although no conflict erupted over
whether the effects test was satisfied, the Fifth, Second, and D.C. Cir-
cuits interpreted "a claim"8 0 to mean either the plaintiff's claim, a
claim generally, or some hypothetical claim, respectively. 81 Thus, the
issue remained whether the second prong "close[d] the federal court-
house door on the plaintiffs. 82
i. Den Norske: "A claim" means "the claim"
In Den Norske Stats Qijeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof,8 3 the plaintiff,
a Norwegian oil company, owned and operated oil drilling platforms
in the North Sea.84 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants formed a
78. Id. at 351.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (emphasis added).
80. See id.
81. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Kruman
v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heer-
eMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
82. O'Brien, supra note 9, at 430.
83. 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
84. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422.
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cartel that conspired to "fix bids and allocate customers, territories,
and projects between 1993 and 1997" over heavy lift barge services in
the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and the Far East. 85 The plaintiff
claimed that the defendants' cartel, which caused anticompetitive ef-
fects in the United States, was also at fault for its damages in paying
for services for offshore oil drilling in the North Sea.86 Two of the
defendants had already pled guilty to a similar criminal complaint,
filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other injured parties
had filed complaints based on the effects in American territory.8 7 In
deciding whether the "effect" on U.S. commerce (Gulf of Mexico "ef-
fects") must support a Sherman Act claim or whether the "effect" on
U.S. commerce must give rise to the plaintiff's claim, the majority
chose the latter view.8 8 First, the Fifth Circuit majority panel felt that
the plain meaning of the FITAIA compelled the result that the an-
ticompetitive effects must give rise to the plaintiff's claim.89 Second,
reasoning that Congress intended to exclude wholly foreign transac-
tions from the FTAIA's scope, the court referred to a United States
House of Representatives report stating that the goal of the FTAIA
was to clarify "when antitrust liability attaches to international busi-
ness activities." 90 Citing district court holdings, the majority panel
found jurisdiction where effects on American commerce supported
the plaintiff's cause of action.91
In dissent, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham argued that "'a' has a
simple and universally understood meaning [as] the indefinite arti-
cle."'92 Had the drafters of the FTAIA wished to use the word "the,"
they would have done so. 93 Although the FTAIA requires the plain-
tiff to demonstrate harm to U.S. competition from the defendant's ac-
tivity, the text of the statute does not mandate showing that the effects
give rise to the plaintiff's claim. 94 Hence, Judge Higginbotham noted
that "the majority cannot find support in a plain text argument. '95 He
85. Id.
86. Id. at 422-23.
87. Id. at 423.
88. See id. at 422 n.6.
89. Id. at 427. Professor Mehra, in criticizing the result, writes: "the Fifth Circuit ... came to
the conclusion that the 'plain language' compelled the conclusion that 'a' must mean 'the."' Salil
K. Mehra, "A" Is for Anachronism: The FTAIA Meets the World Trading System, 107 DIcK. L.
REV. 763, 766 (2003).
90. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490).
91. Id. at 430.
92. Id. at 432 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 433 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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also pointed to legislative history supporting his interpretation of the
FTAIA. 96 The Committee Report on the House bill, which eventually
became the FTAIA, states:
[The F-AIA] does not exclude all persons injured abroad from re-
covering under the antitrust laws of the United States. A course of
conduct in the United States-e.g., price fixing not limited to the
export market-would affect all purchasers of the target domestic
products or services, whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic.
The conduct has the requisite effects in the United States, even if
some purchasers take title abroad or suffer economic injury
abroad. 97
Judge Higginbotham therefore argued that the majority's interpreta-
tion of the FTAIA conflicted with this passage of legislative history.98
Judge Higginbotham also raised an uncontested, deterrence-oriented
policy argument: Private enforcement of U.S. antitrust policies aids
the DOJ's pursuit of criminal and civil suits.99 Not only does the Clay-
ton Act recruit private law enforcement through providing a private
cause of action, but "[the FTAIA also should] ensure[] that [foreign]
parties injured by foreign aspects of the same conspiracy that harms
American commerce are part of the phalanx of enforcers," or group
of plaintiffs able to sue.1°°
ii. Kruman: "A claim" means "any claim"
In Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, the defendants were the
world's two largest auction houses of fine arts and collectibles. 101
They controlled approximately ninety-seven percent of the world mar-
ket. 102 Their agreement to fix the sellers' prices and buyers' commis-
sions and premiums caught the DOJ's attention.10 3 The Second
Circuit, in reversing the district court's dismissal of the claim under
the Fifth Circuit's rationale, held that the second prong (the give rise
to "a" claim prong) of the FTAIA "only requires that the domestic
effect violate the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act."1 4 The
Second Circuit sided with Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Den Nor-
ske, holding that FFAIA's clear language employing "the indefinite
96. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 433 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 436 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
98. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 439 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
101. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2002).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 390-91.
104. Id. at 400.
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article" did not require that the domestic effect give rise to the plain-
tiff's claim.'0 5
iii. Empagran S.A.: "A claim" means "a private claim, even if of
another plaintiff"
The D.C. Circuit's view represented a compromise solution be-
tween the Fifth and Second circuits' approaches, "albeit somewhat
closer to the latter than the former. '10 6 The plaintiffs, foreign vitamin
buyers, sued the defendants, who had purchased and distributed "vita-
mins, vitamin premixes, and bulk vitamin products and precursors"
around the globe. 107 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants en-
gaged in a "worldwide conspiracy to raise, stabilize, and maintain the
prices of vitamins." 108 The plaintiffs contended that "[the] unlawful
price-fixing conduct had adverse effects in the United States and in
other nations that caused injury to [the plaintiffs] in connection with
their foreign purchases of vitamin products."1 09 In reversing the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, the D.C. Circuit es-
tablished its own approach to the FTAIA's second prong: "'[G]iving
rise to a claim' means giving rise to someone's private claim for dam-
ages or equitable relief."110 Where the defendants' wrongful conduct
has the requisite effect on U.S. commerce, the court has subject mat-
ter jurisdiction if the plaintiff alleges that it, or some private party,
suffered "actual or threatened injury" arising from the "U.S. effect of
the defendant's violation of the Sherman Act." '11
b. Empagran holds that "a claim" refers to the plaintiff's claim
Holding that "a claim" means the plaintiff's claim, the Supreme
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit.112 The Court began its analysis by
asking first whether the claimed wrongful conduct is excluded from
Sherman Act jurisdiction as "conduct involving trade or commerce...
105. Id.
106. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
107. Id. at 340.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. Id. at 352.
111. Id. Professor Mehra summarizes: "In other words, even if the plaintiff's claim need not
arise from the domestic effect, there must be a potential Sherman Act claim that another private
party could bring arising from that effect." Mehra, supra note 89, at 769. Note that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit chose not to take a side in this debate in
Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 325 F.3d 836, 840-41 (7th Cir. 2003).
112. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2372 (2004). The court
rejected this textual argument and held that the FTAIA framers intended "a" simply to mean
"an adverse (as opposed to beneficial) effect." Id. at 2371.
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with foreign nations"; 13 and second, if so, whether that conduct is
nonetheless actionable since it has a "direct, substantial, and reasona-
bly foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce, and "such effect gives
rise to a [Sherman Act] claim."'1 14 The Court answered "yes" to the
first question, and "no" to the second.115 With regard to question two,
the Court noted that "the exception does not apply where the plain-
tiff's claim rests solely on the independent foreign harm." 116
The Court's rationale is two-fold: (1) Courts should construe "am-
biguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sover-
eign authority of other nations";'1 7 and (2) Congress intended that the
FTAIA limit the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign con-
duct. 118 As to the first point, the Court cited statutory construction
provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States that limits the "unreasonable exercise of prescriptive ju-
risdiction with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another State." 119 The Court also cited Justice Scalia's dissent in
Hartford for the proposition that this rule of construction is derived
from the principle of "prescriptive comity. ' '120 The Court also rea-
soned, however, that the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign
conduct is consistent with this principle, even if that interferes with a
foreign nation's ability to regulate its own commercial affairs. This
remains true only so long as a "legislative effort [is promoted that]
redress[es] domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive con-
duct has caused." 2 1 Applying these doctrines, in particular the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, to the issue presented, the
Court analyzed the degree of justification for applying U.S. law to for-
eign conduct. 122 Under this framework, foreign claims based solely on
113. Id. at 2363 (quoting FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. Id. at 2371 (citing FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)).
115. Id. at 2366, 2372.
116. The Court held that had U.S. purchasers suffered the same injury from the domestic
injury, those purchasers would have standing. Id. at 2363.
117. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366.
118. Id. at 2369.
119. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(1) (1986)).
120. Id. (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)). "[Prescriptive comity] cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the legiti-
mate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws." Id. This rule seeks
to foster harmony in a world where nations' laws often infringe on each other. Id.
121. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366-67 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa),
148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)).
122. Id. at 2367.
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the effects of foreign misconduct lack the necessary justification for
interfering with the laws of other countries. 123
As to the second point, the Court cited portions of legislative his-
tory to support its argument that Congress intended to clarify and
limit, but not expand the scope of the Sherman Act. 124 Beyond that,
the Court's analysis here was very limited. Additionally, the Court
declined to discuss the issue raised in United Phosphorus.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: UNITED PHOSPHORUS, LTD.
V. ANGUS CHEMICAL CO.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Empagran, the Seventh
Circuit in United Phosphorus held that the FTAIA's two-prong test
pertained to a court's subject matter jurisdiction and was not an ele-
ment of the claim or the plaintiff's cause of action.' 2 5 This holding
was buttressed by appeals to international comity-an apt position in
light of Empagran.126 Notwithstanding that both the Empagran and
United Phosphorus analyses shared an emphasis on international com-
ity, the United Phosphorus dissent raised points that undermined the
majority's logical framework despite its timely policy analysis.'2 7
A. Facts and Procedural Background
United Phosphorus "stemmed from a prior trade-secret litigation in-
volving several of the parties. ' 128 In the beginning of the 1990s, the
plaintiffs, who were from India, decided to acquire the technology to
make 2-Amino-1 Butanol (AB) and 1-Nitro-Propane (1-NP). 129 AB
123. Id. The Court supported this argument with the following rhetorical question: "Why
should American laws supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own deter-
mination about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompe-
titive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign
companies?" Id.
124. Id. at 2369.
125. See generally United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
126. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2363.
127. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 953-54 (Wood, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 953 (Wood, J., dissenting).
129. India had the "greatest incident of tuberculosis in the world .... accounting for twenty-
five percent of new cases." Id. at 945 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court summa-
rized the chemicals and parties as follows:
2-Amino-i Butanol (AB) is the key ingredient of Ethambutol, and 1-Nitro-Propane (1-
NP) is the raw material from which AB is made. To make Ethambutol, defendant Lu-
pin uses AB, which it buys from defendant Chemie, currently the world's only manu-
facturer of AB. Chemie is a German subsidiary, wholly owned by defendant Angus.
The AB is manufactured in Germany. Angus manufactures 1-NP at a plant in Louisi-
ana and is the world's only manufacturer of 1-NP.
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is the primary ingredient of Ethambutol, which is a pharmaceutical
that treats tuberculosis. 130 AB is made from 1-NP, the raw ingredi-
ent.131 The plaintiffs sought out Dr. John Miller, who worked at
Angus. 132 Upon discovering this, Angus sued Miller and the Indian
entities in Illinois state court, "seeking to enjoin Miller from misap-
propriating its trade secrets.' 33 Angus "voluntarily dismissed the
suit" when the state court ordered it to disclose its technology. 34 The
defendants in state court claimed that "but for the Illinois [state court]
action" the defendants "would have sold AB for profit."'1 35 The plain-
tiffs alleged that Angus's state claim was anticompetitive in violation
of the Sherman Act. 136
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the
plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FIFAIA.137 The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, decided by a five jus-
tice majority to affirm the district court's order.1 38
B. Majority Analysis
In recognizing the relevance of the second prong of the FTAIA,
139
the United Phosphorus majority framed its analysis in terms of
whether the second prong "goes to the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion" or whether the requirement is "an element of the claim.' 40 The
court recognized that if the effects test related to the court's subject
matter jurisdiction, the court would discuss the case under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), "which provides for dismissal of an
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 41 If the court could not
read subject matter jurisdiction from "the face of the complaint," it
must analyze the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), by assuming
"that the allegations in the complaint are true."'1 42
130. Id.
131. Id.





137. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. IlI. 2001).
138. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 953.
139. The second prong of the FTAIA requires "that the conduct must have 'a direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' on trade or commerce within the United States, rather
than just on foreign commerce." Id. at 945-46 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)).
140. Id. at 946.
141. Id. The court reminded the reader that "[t]he burden of proof on a 12(b)(1) issue is on
the party asserting jurisdiction." Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
142. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946.
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In contrast, "[i]f the requirement for a substantial effect on [U.S.]
commerce were an element of the claim," then the court would ana-
lyze the issue under summary judgment standards, construing all dis-
puted facts against the movant. 143 The moving party in a summary
judgment motion has a higher threshold to meet because it must show
no effects on U.S. commerce while construing the facts against its
case. 144 The moving party in a dismissal motion must only demon-
strate through "affidavits and other material" that there are no effects
on U.S. commerce. 145
Although the United Phosphorus majority recognized that the Sher-
man Act extends to trade with foreign nations, the court first articu-
lated its position by emphasizing historical "concern about
overreaching under our antitrust laws."1 46 The court acknowledged
that in Alcoa the Second Circuit, then sitting as a court of last resort
for certain antitrust cases, abandoned the strict territorial approach of
American Banana.147 Yet, the United Phosphorus majority empha-
sized that the Alcoa court chose "not [to] read the words of Congress
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers."'1 48
The United Phosphorus majority understood Hartford to interpret
the FTAIA as referring to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 149
Nonetheless, the court mostly discussed Justice Scalia's Hartford dis-
sent, in which he argued that the FTAIA did not address subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.'50 The court understood Scalia's argument that
jurisdiction and the Sherman Act's reach over extraterritorial conduct
were two distinct questions. 151 First, Congress clearly had the "legisla-
143. Id. The court added that the analysis changes if the issue is one of jurisdiction or merits,
and "the procedure employed will dictate the outcome." Id.
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
145. Id.
146. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946.
147. Id. at 947.
148. Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In interpreting Alcoa, the United Phosphorus major-
ity wrote: "Rejected was the notion that Congress intended to punish all whom its courts can
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States." Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 948. The majority wrote: "[flit seems reasonable to conclude, especially in light of
the footnotes, that what the Hartford Court refers to is the court's subject-matter jurisdiction for
Sherman Act claims." Id.
150. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 947.
151. Id. The court continued:
[Scalia's] conclusion was that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, simply
because the Sherman Act claim was not frivolous and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 gives the district
court jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal statutes. The second question, he
said, "has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substan-
tive law turning on the regulatory power over the challenged conduct."
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tive jurisdiction" to pass the Sherman Act under the Commerce
Clause. 52 But the application of international comity principles is rel-
evant to the district court's analysis in interpreting the reach of the
FTAIA in a given case. The United Phosphorus majority claimed that
"the majority in Hartford carrie[d] out th[is] debate with Justice Scalia
in the footnotes. ' 153 The Sherman Act was a "prime example of the
simultaneous exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction and the grant of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.' 54 The United Phosphorus majority con-
cluded, based on the footnotes in the Hartford opinion, that the
Hartford majority referred to "the court's subject matter jurisdiction"
for Sherman Act claims.1 55 Yet, the United Phosphorus majority rec-
ognized that the argument relying on Hartford was tenuous: "One
could argue that in Hartford it is not entirely clear what the phrase
'Sherman Act jurisdiction' means ... [for] '[j]urisdiction is a word of
many, too many, meanings."", 56
The United Phosphorus majority also made a number of side
arguments.1 57  The court supported its "subject matter juris-
diction approach" by referring to other Sherman Act, non-
FTAIA claims.1 58  Highlighting examples of how federal courts
have split over the same issue in the context of other federal
statutes, the court noted that "[t]he jurisdiction-versus-element-of-
the-claim debate seems alive and well."'1 59 The court also argued
Id. (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796 n.22) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 947.
156. Id. at 948 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 948-50.
158. Id. at 948 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court wrote: "[D]espite the breadth of
the Sherman Act prohibitions, jurisdiction may not be invoked under the statute unless the rele-
vant aspect of interstate commerce is identified." Id. (quoting McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of
New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addressing
"whether the interstate commerce requirement of antitrust jurisdiction is satisfied by allegations
.... the conspiracy at issue [had] a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federal
jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
159. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 949. The court in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion found that the plaintiff satisfied subject-matter jurisdiction by making a "good faith allega-
tion." Id. at 948 (citing Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)). In that case,
Scalia argued in dissent that "subject-matter jurisdiction can be called into question either by
challenging the sufficiency of the allegation or by challenging the accuracy of the jurisdictional
facts alleged." Id. at 949 (citation omitted). Scalia in Steel Co. later dismissed Gwaltney as a
"drive-by" jurisdictional ruling. Id. Moreover, in Sharpe v. Jefferson Distributing Co., the Sev-
enth Circuit found under Title VII that the "definition of employer 'as a person ... who has
fifteen or more employees' was an element of the claim, not a matter of the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court ... [because] 'a non-frivolous claim under federal law [is sufficient]; no
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that commentators have discussed the "FTAIA in terms of
jurisdiction."'] 60
The United Phosphorus majority also discussed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's reach into extraterritorial application of federal antitrust law
prior to enactment of the FTAIA. 161 The majority cited in re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, in which the Seventh Circuit, responding to com-
ity concerns raised by various foreign governments, analyzed the juris-
dictional issue as a two-pronged test: "(1) [D]oes subject matter
jurisdiction exist; and (2) if so, should it be exercised?" 162 Moreover,
the court recognized that a bombing's effect on interstate commerce is
an element of the claim in a federal bombing statute. t 63 The court
noted that "sometimes a reference to 'jurisdiction' in statutes is
merely.., a shorthand way of referring to an element of the claim.' ' 64
But the court dismissed such "[c]riminal statutes ... [as] far less than
compelling analogies to FTAIA."'1 65
The United Phosphorus majority also argued that despite the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment,166 appellate courts "continue[d] to treat FTAIA as jurisdic-
tional. ' 167 For example, the court cited the D.C. Circuit opinion in
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.,168 finding that once a
more is necessary for subject matter jurisdiction."' Id. (quoting Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co.,
148 F.3d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1998)).
160. Id. The court provided an example: "Regarding jurisdiction over conduct involving for-
eign commerce, the guidelines for the agencies state [that the] . . . 'jurisdictional limits of the
Sherman Act and the FTC Act are delineated in the FTAIA."' United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at
949 (quoting Antitrust, Unfairness, Deception Policies and Guidelines, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) § 13.107).
161. See id. at 949-50.
162. Id. at 950 (citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)). The
court added that in that case, it had considered "issues raised by the governments of Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and Great Britain as to whether the district court could proceed." Id. at
949.
163. Id. at 949-50 (referring to United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1998), which
involved 18 U.S.C. § 844(I)). The court continued: "We rejected that claim, saying that although
the requirement is often referred to as jurisdictional, it is 'simply one of the essential elements of
§ 844(I)."' Id. at 950 (citation omitted).
164. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 950. The court even noted the "purity of an argument"
that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear Sherman Act claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for cases
"arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. Any requirement of
an effect on commerce would then be an element. Id. To such point, the court responded "that
nothing is quite that simple." Id.
165. Id.
166. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
167. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 950.
168. 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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court finds the requisite wrongful conduct and accompanying effects
on U.S. commerce, "subject matter jurisdiction is proper." 169
The United Phosphorus majority argued that by passing the FTAIA,
Congress intended to "jurisdiction[ally] strip[]" judicial oversight of
antitrust matters arising abroad.170 According to the court, fulfilling
the requirements of the FTAIA would be "the predicate for antitrust
jurisdiction."u 7 1
The final argument of the United Phosphorus majority rested on
policy grounds. 172 It argued that to accord foreign governments com-
ity, U.S. courts should "tread softly in this area."'1 73 The United Phos-
phorus majority eventually concluded that the district court's findings
were not "clearly erroneous" and found subject matter jurisdiction
absent. 174
In sum, United Phosphorus restricted application of the Sherman
Act to claims of extraterritorial origin unless the plaintiff could show,
beyond mere allegations, the following: (1) The defendant's wrongful
conduct had "a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect"
on U.S. commerce; 175 and (2) the plaintiff's claim of injury was based
on such effects.176 Requiring these showings will reduce the number
of claims heard in U.S. courts.
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent noted that although the various authorities cited by the
majority referred to "jurisdiction," the issue, as framed by the major-
ity, "ha[d] also never been analyzed thoroughly by any other
169. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 951 (quoting Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 340 (D.C. Cit. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court added
that it "cannot dismiss these cases as 'drive-by' jurisdictional rulings." Id. at 951.
170. Id. at 951-52.
171. Id. at 952 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the court added that Congress stated: "This
bill only establishes the standards necessary for assertion of United States Antitrust jurisdiction.
The substantive antitrust issues on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim would remain unchanged."
Id.
172. Id.
173. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952.
174. Id. The court wrote: "The [district] court found that there was virtually no evidence that
the plaintiffs would have made any sales in the United States." Id. While the plaintiffs may have
had intentions to engage in commerce in the United States, the district court found that the
plaintiffs "'had no actual plans to sell AB in this country and that there would have been no
significant AB sales opportunities for Plaintiffs in this country even if they had tried to sell AB
here."' Id. at 953 (quoting United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1012 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
175. Id. at 945-46.
176. Id. at 949.
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court. ' 177 The dissent made four other points in its argument: (1) The
FTAIA's language supports an element of the claim approach; (2) the
court's subject matter jurisdiction methodology conflicts with the U.S.
Supreme Court's analysis in Steel Co.; (3) "procedural consequences"
of the majority's characterization would offend the policies of the
FTAIA and U.S. antitrust law in general; and (4) the subject matter
jurisdiction approach ignores the history of applying U.S. antitrust law
to foreign activity. 178
1. The Language of the FTAIA Supports the Element of the Claim
Approach
According to the dissent, the plain language of the FIFAIA supports
a reading that satisfying its two prongs is a matter the plaintiff must
ultimately prove at trial.179 First, the dissent mentioned that nowhere
does the statute reference an intent "to strip federal courts of their
competence to hear and decide antitrust cases with a foreign ele-
ment. ' 180 Second, "jurisdiction-stripping rules must be expressed
clearly." 81 The FTAIA's provision limiting applicability does not
mean that "courts do not have fundamental competence to consider
defined categories of cases. '182
2. The Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction Methodology Conflicts
with the U.S. Supreme Court's Analysis in Steel Co.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Steel Co.1 83 that the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), au-
thorizing private suits if certain factors were met, "did not affect the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction." 184 Although the statute
used the word "jurisdiction," that factor was not determinative of the
Court's holding.185 Further, the Court "reaffirmed the long-standing
rule that power to adjudicate a case does not depend on whether in
the final analysis the plaintiff has a valid claim.
1 86
177. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 953 (Wood, J., dissenting). She continued: "But neither
the majority nor those earlier opinions have distinguished carefully between judicial and legisla-
tive jurisdiction-or, to put it differently, between jurisdiction to decide a case and jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law." Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 953-54 (Wood, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 954 (Wood, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
182. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 955 (Wood, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
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The United Phosphorus dissent observed that along the spectrum of
"extraterritorial application of U.S. law," from "no application" 187 to
"virtually unlimited [application], ' ' 188 the FTAIA falls in the middle
with its "effects" test establishing an element of the claim in merit
analysis.189 While rejecting the United Phosphorus majority's inter-
pretation of the Hartford majority opinion, 190 the United Phosphorus
dissent noted that Justice Scalia's dissent in Hartford acquired major-
ity authority in Steel Co., and later in United States v. Cotton.191 Other
case law, including those interpreting criminal statutes, held that ef-
fects-on-commerce statutes did not affect the court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 192
3. Procedural Consequences of the Majority Characterization
Would Lead to Perverse Results Regarding the Policies
of U.S. Antitrust Law
Although review of subject matter jurisdiction is usually straightfor-
ward, 193 inquiries into the "effects" on domestic commerce or U.S.
import commerce "threaten to become a preliminary trial on the mer-
its.' 194 Effects on commerce issues and the merits will often be
187. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no application beyond U.S.
borders)).
188. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 955 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (pro-
viding virtually unlimited application for a private right of action for civil damages by any U.S.
national injured "by reason of an act of international terrorism," regardless of the location of the
act or the defendant's country of origin)).
189. Id. at 955 (Wood, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood argued that the Hartford majority thought
it unnecessary to confront the FTAIA's impact on the case and thus refused to respond to Justice
Scalia's element versus jurisdiction arguments. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
191. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting). In Hartford, Scalia, writing
for the dissent, reasoned: "[a] cause of action under our law was asserted here, and the court had
the power to determine whether it was or was not well founded in law and in fact." Id. (Wood,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Further, the United Phosphorus dissent noted that "[this] legal
principle ... [that assertions establish subject matter jurisdiction] was later adopted by a major-
ity of the Court in Steel Co. and then later in United States v. Cotton." Id. at 956 (Wood, J.,
dissenting); see United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
192. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting).
193. Courts can usually answer whether a cause of action arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
by reading the complaint. Id. at 957 (Wood, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). For example, in Timberlane, the complaint was filed in 1973,
but due to a series of appeals over whether the court had proper subject matter jurisdiction, an
outcome did not ensue until 1985. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (1976)). Thus, twelve years later the court resolved the "jurisdic-
tional" issue. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
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closely tied calls for a more complete analysis under the "element of
the claim" approach.1 95
Another negative procedural effect of the subject matter jurisdic-
tion approach is that this statutory interpretation gives the defendant
in a lawsuit the chance to raise the lack of subject matter jurisdiction
argument at any time.196 This would give the losing defendant an op-
portunity to "revisit the complex question" before the U.S. Supreme
Court regardless of whether the defendant preserved his objection at
the district court or appellate court stage.197 Even if the parties were
willing to stipulate the findings to further resolution of the case, the
Court's sua sponte duty to raise the issue might cause
complications.198
Another negative outcome1 99 of the subject matter jurisdiction ap-
proach is its effect on appellate review. 2°° If district courts must re-
solve jurisdictional issues in advance, then courts of appeals will be
required to give such findings deferential review. 20 1 This will tie the
hands of appellate courts in considering the delicate subject of inter-
national comity better left to high courts than a solitary judge. 20 2
4. The Subject Matter Jurisdiction Approach Ignores the History of
Applying U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Activity
In reviewing case law from the beginning of the twentieth century,
the court noted that in response to the Alcoa decision, scholars have
addressed the question of how prescriptive jurisdictional lines should
be drawn among nations with respect to international law.20 3 The pre-
sent result of such efforts appears in the Restatement (Third) of For-
195. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
196. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 957 (Wood, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 958 (Wood, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
199. The court mentioned a separate concern of removal: "If Congress indeed meant to strip
the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign commerce antitrust cases, then
those cases revert to state courts." Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 958-59 (Wood, J., dissenting).
202. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 958 (Wood, J., dissenting). The dissent lost its patience
with the majority's rationale:
The subject matter jurisdiction characterization makes no sense, either from the
point of view of the policies being furthered by the FTAIA, or from the standpoint of
judicial administration. We should not adopt a perverse decision just because parties
have chosen to file motions under Rule 12(b)(1) instead of Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, or
because courts have unquestioningly adopted the diction of "subject matter jurisdic-
tion" without careful examination.
Id. at 959 (Wood, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 960 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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eign Relations Law of the United States.204 The Restatement recognizes
three types of jurisdiction: "[J]urisdiction to prescribe," "jurisdiction
to adjudicate," and "jurisdiction to enforce. '205 With respect to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the Restatement provides that "[j]urisdiction to
prescribe with respect to transnational activity depends not on a par-
ticular link.., but on a concept of reasonableness based on a number
of factors to be considered and evaluated. '20 6
While some appellate courts have granted dismissal motions under
lack of subject matter jurisdiction,207 more often they have discussed
the merits of the plaintiffs' FrAIA claims "rather than dwelling on the
precise procedural manner" of the plaintiff's claim.208 Unlike the
United Phosphorus majority, no other appellate court has focused on
the "jurisdiction versus element" analysis.209
5. Concluding Notes of the Dissent
The majority holding might have a significant deterrent effect on
the DOJ's antitrust prosecutions in the Seventh Circuit.210 Ninety
percent of fines obtained in criminal antitrust matters come from in-
ternational cartel cases.211 Moreover, allowing a criminal defendant
to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction continuously on appeal
would further impede the DOJ's efforts.212 The dissent also cautioned
that the majority approach would require courts to find subject matter
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, PART IV
(1987).
205. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 960-61 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, PART IV, § 401 (1987)).
206. Id. at 961 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, PART IV, commentary to § 401 (1987)). Section 415, dealing with
jurisdiction over anticompetitive activities, permits jurisdiction to prescribe over activities occur-
ring outside the United States "if a principal purpose of the conduct or agreement is to interfere
with the commerce of the United States, and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that
commerce." Id. at 961 n.2 (Wood, J., dissenting).
207. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated
by F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004); Kruman v. Christie's
Int'l PLC, 284 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241
F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
208. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 962 (Wood, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 962 (Wood, J., dissenting). The dissent added:
It is this court, sitting en banc, that will be the first one to give a fully considered answer
to the question whether the FTAIA strips the federal courts of their competence to
hear certain cases that lack sufficient connections to the United States, or if it affirma-
tively imposes on a plaintiff the burden of proving as an element of its case the exis-
tence of those connections.
Id. at 964 (Wood, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
212. Id. at 965 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction in all cases interpreting federal statutes that contain ef-
fects on commerce elements. 213 This result "has the potential of up-
setting far more than the small set of cases that present foreign trade
antitrust issues. 21
4
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY AND DISSENTS' ARGUMENTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE TEXT OF THE FTAIA, JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In debating whether the FTAIA created an element of the plain-
tiff's claim or established a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction
over actions arising under the Sherman Act, the United Phosphorus
majority and dissent argue past each other.215 This analysis attempts
to shape their arguments into a logical framework and discusses the
merits of both sides' contentions. First, this section analyzes the text
of the Sherman Act and the debate about whether the majority or
dissent presents a stronger argument. Second, this section discusses
the key Supreme Court cases cited by both opinions and pertaining to
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction versus element of the claim. In
particular, this section discusses whether the United Phosphorus ma-
jority properly applies the policy of international comity in light of
Empagran. Third, this section discusses which of the opinions ad-
vances a stronger interpretation in light of the legislative history and
the textual interpretation of the FTAIA, largely arguing against the
majority's interpretation of the FTAIA.
A. Textual Analysis of the FTAIA
In Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Missions Indi-
ans, the Supreme Court held that "'absent a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intention to the contrary, statutory language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.'1, 216 Following this rationale, the United Phos-
phorus dissent persuasively argued, "One will search in vain [in the
FTAIA] for any hint that Congress was attempting to strip federal
courts of their competence to hear and decide antitrust cases with a
213. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 965 (Wood, J., dissenting). "If effect-on-commerce rules
are truly jurisdictional, then they are jurisdictional for every statute that contains commerce
elements.... The majority's approach therefore has the potential of upsetting far more than the
small set of cases that present foreign trade antitrust issues." Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
215. The United Phosphorus majority opinion lacks a clear structure whereas the dissent is
based on four points of law and policy. This analysis will discuss the merits of both sides' conten-
tions on three points of law and policy.
216. See Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772
(1984) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 308, 312 (1983)).
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foreign element. '217 In fact, the majority recognized the "purity of an
argument that [the FTAIA] provides federal question jurisdiction for
cases 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States"' which would thus make the FTAIA's "effects" test an ele-
ment of the claim.2 18 But the majority responded "that nothing is
quite that simple," providing support only for the exception that frivo-
lous suits do not give rise to jurisdiction.219 Interestingly, a reading of
Scalia's opinion in Steel Co. 22 0 suggests that this is the only exception
where a claim arising under the Constitution, a statute, or a treaty
would not give rise to subject matter jurisdiction (assuming the statute
itself does not provide otherwise).2 21
The dissent also noted that although there is precedent that treats
statutes with jurisdictional language as nonjurisdictional, there are no
examples of the converse-"treating something as jurisdictional that is
phrased in terms of the scope of application of a statute. '222 Accord-
ing to the dissent, the Seventh Circuit has held before that statutes
that strip courts of their jurisdiction "must be expressed clearly. '223
Further, the FTAIA is anything but a paradigm of lucidity.224
217. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 954 (Wood, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 950 (Wood, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
219. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
220. See infra Part IV.B.1.
221. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
222. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 954 (Wood, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). The dissent wrote:
In Czerkies v. U.S. Department of Labor, we held that the door-closing statute prohibit-
ing judicial review of certain federal workers' compensation claims should not be con-
strued to bar review of constitutional claims in the absence of express language to that
effect. The same approach is appropriate for other kinds of jurisdiction-stripping
statutes.
Id. (Wood, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent added: "Naturally, when Congress
does speak clearly, as it did in the statute that bars judicial review of certain immigration deci-
sions,... the courts do and should recognize that their competence to act has been withdrawn."
Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). The Court referred to McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F.3d 985 (7th Cir.
2000), where the Court dismissed the suit trying to avoid § 1252(a)(2)(B), providing that "not-
withstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any judg-
ment regarding the granting of relief under section 1255." Id. at 954-55 (Wood, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that "[ljanguage like that of the FTAIA, stating that a law does not 'apply' in
certain circumstances, cannot be equated to language stating that the courts do not have funda-
mental competence to consider defined categories of cases." Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
224. One commentator argues that "[a]s an attempt to clarify the intended scope of the anti-
trust laws with regard to foreign trade, the FTAIA must be viewed as a failure." See Note, supra
note 3, at 2136.
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B. Precedential Treatment: Whether Case Law Supports the
Majority's Subject Matter Jurisdiction Approach or the
Element of the Claim Approach
This subsection details arguments that undermine the United Phos-
phorus majority's approach. First and foremost, nonfrivilous allega-
tions that wrongful conduct falls within the court's purview satisfies
subject matter jurisdiction unless the controlling law states otherwise.
Second, the United Phosphorus opinion incorrectly applies the Su-
preme Court's understanding of prescriptive comity and its effect on a
court's decision to affirm or decline subject matter jurisdiction. Third,
pre-FTAIA claims are irrelevant.
1. Supreme Court Precedent Asserts Jurisdiction Based on
Nonfrivilous Allegations Unless the Applicable Statute
Explicitly States Otherwise
Supreme Court precedent requires that absent explicitly controlling
language to the contrary, nonfrivilous allegations arising under federal
law will satisfy the plaintiff's burden in establishing the court's subject
matter jurisdiction.225 For instance, in Steel Co., the Court held that
the EPCRA, which authorizes private suits depending on whether the
plaintiffs satisfied certain elements, did not need to be satisfied before
a court finds subject matter jurisdiction proper.226 Justice Scalia
stated, "It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid
(as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case." 227 Citing Bell v. Hood, the Court stated that "ju-
risdiction ... is not defeated ... by the possibility that the averments
might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually
recover. ' '228 A court has jurisdiction if "the Constitution and the laws
of the United States are given one construction and [jurisdiction] will
be defeated if they are given another," unless the plaintiff's claim ap-
pears "immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining juris-
diction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.
229
Alternatively, a court should deny jurisdiction where the claim is "so
insubstantial, implausible, [and] foreclosed by prior decisions of this
225. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.
226. Id. at 109-10.
227. Id. at 89.
228. Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
229. Id.
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Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy. "230
Earlier in his Hartford dissent, Justice Scalia put forth the same
principles in more detail. 231 Scalia's analysis was two-pronged: (1)
"[W]hether the district court had [subject matter] jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claims; and (2) "whether the Sherman Act reache[d] the ex-
traterritorial conduct alleged. ' 232 Regarding the first prong, he found
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the
FTAIA because the plaintiffs had asserted "nonfrivilous claims under
the Sherman Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 vest[ed] district courts with
subject-matter jurisdiction over cases 'arising under' federal stat-
utes. '233 Regarding the second prong, which pertained to the extra-
territorial scope of the Sherman Act, he would have held that it did
not affect a district court's jurisdiction.234 Rather, this issue was one
of "substantive law" regarding "whether, in enacting the Sherman
Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged con-
duct. '235 If a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case a court does
not reject the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or "want of
power to adjudicate. '236 Instead, the court "decides the claim, ruling
on the merits that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action
under the relevant statute. '237
The Hartford majority opinion further supports the argument that
nonfrivilous allegations arising under federal law are sufficient for
proper subject matter jurisdiction despite the opposing arguments of
the United Phosphorus majority. The Seventh Circuit clearly relied
on Hartford.238 The majority argued that Hartford endorsed the
230. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Cotton expanded on its decision in Steel Co. Citing Justice Holmes,
the Court wrote that "a district court 'has jurisdiction of all crimes cognizable under the author-
ity of the United States ... [and] [t]he objection that the indictment does not charge a crime
against the United States goes only to the merits of the case." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
625, 631 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916)).
231. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
236. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
237. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
238. As previously discussed in Part II, the plaintiffs in Hartford alleged that the defendant
insurance companies conspired to restrict the availability and provisions of commercial general
liability insurance in the United States, a claim subject to Sherman Act section 1 review. Id. at
770. The Court in Hartford found no congressional intent to restrict courts from exercising sub-
ject matter jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. Id. at 798. Assuming that a court
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FTAIA as a prerequisite to finding Sherman Act subject matter juris-
diction. 239 Language in the Hartford opinions, however, undermines
the United Phosphorus majority. First, the Hartford Court recited the
"well established '240 rule that "[the] Sherman Act applies to foreign
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some sub-
stantial effect in the United States."'241 In discussing the FFAIA,
which Congress intended to limit subject matter jurisdiction over ex-
port transactions not affecting the American economy, the Court ob-
served that "it is unclear how it might apply to the conduct alleged
here. ' 242 However, the Hartford majority decided not to address this
issue.2 43 Nonetheless, it concluded, "Assuming that the FTAIA's
standard affects this litigation ... the conduct alleged plainly meets its
requirements. '244 The Hartford majority did not address the point
could decline jurisdiction over foreign conduct, international comity would not be an appropri-
ate justification for refusing jurisdiction under the Hartford facts. Id.
Justice Scalia's dissent did not address whether the FTAIA limited a court's subject matter
jurisdiction versus whether it established the elements a plaintiff must show to recover under the
Sherman Act. However, Justice Scalia discussed when the court should consider international
comity concerns in finding jurisdiction and disagreed with the Hartford majority. Id. The Hart-
ford majority reacted as follows: "Justice S[calia] says that we put the cart before the horse ...
for he argues that [a conflict of laws allowing the Court to consider international comity con-
cerns] may be apposite only after a determination that jurisdiction over the foreign acts is rea-
sonable," in other words, a comity analysis should follow and not be part of the jurisdiction
analysis. Id. at 799 n.25. The Hartford majority simply dismissed the argument on the ground
that a direct conflict of laws, which would preclude jurisdiction, was the sole issue before the
court. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 799 n.25.
239. The Seventh Circuit wrote:
One could argue that in Hartford it is not entirely clear what the phrase "Sherman
Act jurisdiction" means. After all, "jurisdiction is a word of many, too many mean-
ings." But it seems reasonable to conclude, especially in light of the footnotes, that
what the Hartford Court refers to is the court's subject-matter jurisdiction for Sherman
Act claims.
United Phosphorus, 332 F.3d at 948 (citations omitted).
In opposition, the United Phosphorus dissent criticized this interpretation, arguing that for the
majority in Hartford it was "unnecessary to address the FTAIA's effect on the case at all, and
thus it had no need to engage the dissenters on the 'element' versus 'jurisdiction' point." Id. at
956 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Immediately following this passage, Judge Diane
Wood added that Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion against a "subject matter jurisdiction" ap-
proach became controlling law in Steel Co. and United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). Id.
(Wood, J., dissenting).
240. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 797 n.23 (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 795. Interestingly, in Metallgesellschaft, an opinion written by Judge Diane Wood,
the Seventh Circuit held that allegations of injury from anticompetitive conduct in the U.S. satis-
fied a finding of subject matter jurisdiction even under the Den Norske approach. See
Metallgesellschaft, AG v. Sumitono Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2003).
244. Hartford, 508 U.S. at 797 n.23 (emphasis added). Furthermore, in addressing Justice
Scalia's argument that comity considerations come into play in determining whether to assert
jurisdiction, the majority in Hartford found that comity considerations came into play "only after
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that the United Phosphorus majority elicited-that is, whether the
FTAIA circumscribes a court's subject matter jurisdiction. On the
contrary, it appears the Hartford majority accepted the plaintiff's alle-
gations as true for purposes of finding subject matter jurisdiction. By
relying on allegations to find subject matter jurisdiction, the majority
suggested that the "effects" test is not a matter the district court must
address before asserting jurisdiction but rather it is an issue addressed
on the merits.
Further, while not speaking directly to the issue in United Phos-
phorus, the Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran appears to rely on
the plaintiff's allegations in analyzing whether legislative history sug-
gested finding subject matter jurisdiction under the facts of that case:
We recognize principles of comity provide Congress greater leeway
when it seeks to control through legislation the actions of American
companies.., and some of the anticompetitive price-fixing conduct
alleged here took place in America. But the higher foreign prices of
which the foreign plaintiffs here complain are not the consequence
of any domestic anticompetitive conduct that Congress sought to
forbid.245
In response to Steel Co., the United Phosphorus majority argued
that appellate courts nonetheless "continue[d] to treat [the] FTAIA as
jurisdictional. '246  Yet, not one of the cases cited demonstrated
whether those other circuits considered the FTAIA's "effects" test a
jurisdictional prerequisite. 247 Further, these cases may simply have re-
ferred to subject matter jurisdiction as "a shorthand way of referring
to an element of the claim"-an admittedly frequent occurrence. 248
a court has determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction." Id.
at 797 n.24 (emphasis added).
245. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2367 (2004).
246. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 950 (7th Cir. 2003).
247. Id. The court wrote:
Whatever their differences in interpretation of the Act or the effect it has on prior
judge-made law [i.e., referring to Steel Co.], all have treated the issue as one of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Kruman (review of the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA); Den Norske ... (finding that the district
court properly dismissed antitrust claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
FTAIA); Carpet Group (finding that FTAIA did not divest the court of subject matter
jurisdiction on the claims presented); Filetech S.A. (finding that the district court should
have looked to the factual matters presented to it regarding whether subject matter
jurisdiction existed under FTAIA).
Id. (citations omitted).
248. Id. While recognizing that such courts have referred to their "jurisdiction" as shorthand
for referring to an element of the claim-undermining much of the Court's precedential argu-
ments-it nevertheless characterized interpretations of such "[ciriminal statutes . . . [as] far less
than compelling analogies to [the] FIAIA." Id. at 950 (referring to its decision in United States
v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1998), which involved a federal bombing statute). Are federal-
ism issues less important than international comity concerns? Both policies address whether
1306 [Vol. 54:1277
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For instance, the court cited Caribbean Broad Systems, Ltd. v. Cable
& Wireless, PLC, in which the court found "subject matter jurisdiction
only to the extent that the complaint alleges that the challenged con-
duct has a 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' on
domestic commerce under the FTAIA. ' 249 These court holdings that
allegations are sufficient to establish a court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion suggest that plaintiffs under the FTAIA need not establish sub-
ject matter jurisdiction apart from their prima facie case elements.250
The United Phosphorus majority later argued that "commentators"
refer to the FTAIA as "jurisdictional. '251 The court provided no basis
to determine whether the commentators referred to the determination
of jurisdiction through a prescreening, jurisdictional finding, or an
analysis on the merits.2 5 2 Even law review commentators have over-
looked this point or failed to clarify it.253 For example, David Dzara
argues that
Statoil [the plaintiff in Den Norske] was therefore obligated to sat-
isfy the two-prong test in order for a U.S. federal court to have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over its claim. The majority was correct in
deciding that Statoil satisfied the first prong [effects test] because
courts should exercise jurisdiction where another sovereign's jurisdiction may be offended. The
court simply failed to explain itself. Moreover, U.S. antitrust laws carry criminal penalties. In
fact, as the dissent poignantly noted, ninety percent of fines that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) collects in antitrust matters are derived from international cartel cases. See id. at 964
(Wood, J., dissenting).
249. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 951 (emphasis added) (quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys.
Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
250. In discussing the "paramount importance of the statute's effects requirement... [a]bsent
allegations of domestic effects, courts have shown a staunch unwillingness to grant antitrust ju-
risdiction. The negative implication of this point is equally crucial-when foreign plaintiffs can
show that anticompetitive conduct has domestic effects, U.S. courts must accept subject matter
jurisdiction." Note, supra note 3, at 2138. The author's own language neither helps nor hurts
our analysis. The author first writes that "allegations" are sufficient for jurisdiction, and then
writes that the plaintiff must show such harm. Id. The author also cites Caribbean Broadcasting
System Ltd, which supports the latter interpretation. Id.
251. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 949. The majority supports its position by referencing
ABA articles, stating that "to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA, a plaintiff
must also show that 'such effect'-i.e., the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable an-
ticompetitive domestic effect-'gives rise to' a Sherman Act Claim." Id. (citations omitted).
Further, "the [DOJI and the Federal Trade Commission [(FTC)] both consider the statute juris-
dictional," and the agencies' guidelines provide, "[T]he jurisdictional limits of the Sherman Act
and the FTC Act are delineated in the FTAIA." Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the ABA
International Antitrust Guidelines provide that "anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S. do-
mestic or foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct
occurs or the nationality of the parties involved." Id. (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 949.
253. See Dzara, supra note 9, at 438.
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the defendants' conduct did have a direct, substantial, and reasona-
bly foreseeable effect on domestic commerce.2 54
But the majority in Den Norske did not specifically make a finding as
to the substance of the effects before ruling that the plaintiff satisfied
the first prong. The court ruled instead on the complaint's allega-
tions.255 The Den Norske court wrote,
We accept the contention that Statoil has sufficiently alleged that the
defendants' conduct-that is, the agreement among heavy-lift ser-
vice providers to divide territory, rig bids, and fix prices-had a di-
rect, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the United
States market. Statoil alleges that the conspiracy not only forced
purchasers of heavy-lift services in the Gulf of Mexico to pay in-
flated prices, but also that the agreement compelled Americans to
pay supra-competitive prices for oil. These allegations are sufficient
to satisfy the first requirement of the FTAIA. 256
Despite the United Phosphorus majority's insistence that "courts of
appeals continue to treat [the] FTAIA as jurisdictional, 2 57 strong lan-
guage indicates otherwise. In sum, there is clear language throughout
Supreme Court and appellate court decisions that suggest that a plain-
tiff's nonfrivilous allegations arising under federal law properly invoke
the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Empagran Suggests that Justice Scalia's Prescriptive Comity
Approach in Hartford Should Control When Comity
Is at Issue
This section argues that the United Phosphorus majority misapplied
how international comity should affect the court's decision regarding
whether to find subject matter jurisdiction under Supreme Court prin-
ciples of prescriptive comity. The doctrine of prescriptive comity, as it
pertains to restricting the IFTAIA's scope, has been discussed by two
Court opinions: Recently in Empagran and a decade ago in Justice
Scalia's Hartford dissent.258 Empagran's analysis is instructive, yet
limited. Albeit not controlling, Scalia's dissent is more detailed and
relevant to the issue of when comity concerns affect the assertion of a
254. Id.
255. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 426-27 (5th Cir.
2001).
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 950.
258. As discussed in Part II, the Hartford majority required the plaintiff to allege a direct
conflict of laws before the court would consider international comity considerations. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993). This approach, in light of Empagran, which
considers comity concerns absent any allegation of any conflict, has arguably been overruled. F.
Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2369 (2004).
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court's subject matter jurisdiction. 259 This approach first finds subject
matter jurisdiction based on nonfrivilous allegations arising under fed-
eral law. Subsequently, the court should determine if it is proper to
assert jurisdiction based on a number of factors-an analysis best not
left to expedient resolution prior to hearing the substance of the case.
a. United Phosphorus Emphasizes International Comity in
Deciding that the FTAIA Limits a Court's Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Although phrased in terms of policy, the most forceful point of the
United Phosphorus majority opinion was that U.S. antitrust law must
consider the interests of the relevant foreign jurisdiction before exer-
cising authority. 260 In fact, the majority began and ended its analysis
by appealing to international comity.261 First, the court announced
the rule from American Banana that "[d]espite the fact that, using lan-
guage borrowed from the Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion, the Sherman Act itself prohibits agreements restraining 'trade or
commerce .. .with foreign nations,' there has long been concern
about overreaching under our antitrust laws. '2 62 Subsequently, al-
though many recognized the Alcoa "effects" test as abandoning inter-
national comity concerns inherent in the American Banana "strict
territorial approach, 12 63 the majority nonetheless selectively quoted
that case, providing for an interpretation that cut against previously
held views. 264
The court concluded that its subject matter jurisdiction rule better
accorded with the policy of international comity. The court empha-
sized that "[t]he extraterritorial scope of our antitrust laws touches
our relations with foreign governments, and so, it seems, it is prudent
to tread softly in this area. '265 The United Phosphorus majority ar-
gued that if the "effects" test were resolved on the merits, the lawsuit
259. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946, 952.
261. Id. at 947, 952.
262. Id. at 946 (quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)).
263. See supra Part II.B.
264. According to the United Phosphorus majority, the Alcoa Court "recognized that it
should not read the words of Congress without regard to the limitations customarily observed by
nations upon the exercise of their powers." United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 947 (citation omit-
ted). Alcoa created an "effects" test limiting Sherman Act jurisdiction to conduct that intended
to affect and did affect U.S. commerce. Id. The United Phosphorus majority felt that "[r]ejected
was the notion that Congress intended 'to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequences within the United States."' Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
265. Id. at 952.
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could potentially affect foreign markets in which "resolution of the
issue could be delayed until late in the case. '266 The court failed to
explain how the element of the claim approach might adversely im-
pact foreign markets. If the "effects" prong is a matter of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, the United Phosphorus majority argued that it would
be disposed of sooner or settled upon a determination that the alleged
anticompetitive conduct did not substantially affect U.S. markets. 267
This argument is not necessarily accurate because subject matter juris-
diction could be raised at every stage of litigation.268 Thus, although
the United Phosphorus majority supported the district court's treat-
ment of the "effects" prong as determining one of subject matter juris-
diction by explaining that its approach decreased the possibility of
offending other nations' economic policies, the majority failed to ex-
plain how the element of the claim approach might adversely impact
foreign markets. 269
b. Empagran's Prescriptive Comity Analysis Incorporates
International Comity Concerns into the Court's Statutory
Construction of the FTAIA
Empagran's comity analysis incorporates elements from the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and references Justice Scalia's
Hartford dissent.270 As discussed in Part II, Empagran now requires
the plaintiff to allege a nexus between his claim and the negative ef-
fects on U.S. commerce from foreign anticompetitive activity.2 71 The
Court's two-part reasoning relied on principles of statutory construc-
tion and "the FTAIA's language and history. '272 In regard to the first
part, the Court recited the rule that ambiguous statutes be construed
to avoid "unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other nations. '2 73 Reasonableness depends on a variety of factors,
such as the relationship to the domestic country, harm to the domestic
country's interests, extent to which foreign nations regulate, and "the
potential for conflict. ' 274 The Court's desire "to avoid unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations" reflects in-
266. Id.
267. Id. Moreover, the judge must raise the issue sua sponte if the parties fail to do so. United
Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952.
268. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946.
269. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946.
270. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004).
271. Id. at 2365.
272. Id. at 2366, 2370.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2367.
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ternational law principles that the Court assumes Congress follows.
275
The Court cited the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States,276 and Scalia's Hartford dissent as "identifying [a]
rule of construction . . .derived from the principle of 'prescriptive
comity.' ,,277 The doctrine of prescriptive comity cautions courts to as-
sume that the legislature has accounted for foreign interests, while it
condones interference with other nations' laws "[if those laws] reflect
a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign an-
ticompetitive conduct has caused. '278 The Court then held that the
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct that gave rise to
the plaintiff's claim does not redress domestic injury and, therefore,
does not provide reasonable grounds on which to interfere with for-
eign jurisdictions. 279
c. Scalia's Hartford Dissent Discusses When and How Prescriptive
Comity Affects the Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction
While Empagran's prescriptive comity analysis addressed a separate
question, Scalia's Hartford dissent applied this approach to a disposi-
tive subissue in United Phosphorus.280 Namely, does prescriptive
comity preclude the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign con-
duct before or after the court finds subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claims? Justice Scalia would first find jurisdiction based on
a plaintiff's nonfrivilous claims. 281 Then Scalia would decide if inter-
national comity prevents the application of U.S. law by looking at con-
gressional intent as to whether the application of U.S. law would be
unreasonable. 282 Either way, international comity was irrelevant to
whether subject matter jurisdiction was proper.283 Additionally, such
a factor-by-factor analysis is an inappropriate method for determining
subject matter jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia's analysis has been coined "not as one of the jurisdic-
tion of the courts, but rather as the pre-Timberlane interpretation
275. Id. at 2366.
276. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 403(1)-403(2) (1986)). The Court viewed these sections as "lim-
iting the unreasonable exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to a person or activity




280. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
282. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra Part IV.B.1.
283. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90; Hartford, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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question of congressional intent. ' 284 First, Scalia discussed prescrip-
tive jurisdiction as pertaining to the sovereign's authority to apply its
laws to people or activities, a question separate from "jurisdiction to
adjudicate. ' 285 Under the former doctrine, once a statute is under-
stood to apply extraterritorially, courts define the statute's outer reach
pursuant to the cannon 286 of statutory interpretation announced in Al-
coa: "[Courts] are not to read general words . . . [of the Sherman]
Act[] without regard to the limitations customarily observed by na-
tions upon the exercise of their powers, limitations which generally
correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws."' 287 In other
words, under prescriptive comity principles courts first presume that
the legislature has exercised jurisdiction. Comity incorporates
"choice-of-law principles," which, "'in the absence of contrary con-
gressional direction,' are assumed to be incorporated into our substan-
tive laws having extraterritorial reach. '288 Viewing comity in this light
informs the Court's decision as to whether the Sherman Act prohibits
particular conduct. Justice Scalia argued that appellate courts have
confused the issue with one of "comity of courts," leading courts to
mischaracterize the issue as one of "abstention," in other words,
whether the court should "excercise or decline jurisdiction. ' 28 9
284. See Tuttle, supra note 9, at 350.
285. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Moreover, Justice Scalia found that
this rule was "independent of the presumption against extraterritoriality." Id. at 814-15 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Scalia argued that courts should pre-
sume that Congress did not exceed "those customary international-law limits" with respect to
prescriptive jurisdiction even though he thought that "statutes should not be interpreted to regu-
late foreign persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international
law." Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Com-
pany, in which a Spanish plaintiff sued a Spanish defendant for a tort injury, the Court found
"the presumption against extraterritorial application ofU.S. law" inapplicable because the tort
occurred in U.S. waters. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)). Nonetheless, the Court applied "principles of choice of law that are
consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime law and with due recognition of our self-
regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in the regulation of maritime com-
merce as part of the legitimate concern of the international community." Id. at 815 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). Thus, the principal considerations in this choice of law analysis
were "the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign countries." Hartford, 509 U.S.
at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
287. Id. at 816-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Al-
coa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
288. Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 382-83).
289. Id. at 818 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the majority in Hartford
made this same mistake. Justice Scalia added: "[b]ecause courts are generally reluctant to refuse
the exercise of conferred jurisdiction, confusion on this seemingly theoretical point can have the
very practical consequence of greatly expanding the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act."
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Whether comity concerns prevent application of U.S. law depends on
a reasonableness inquiry,290 an analysis that follows a finding of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 29'
Justice Scalia's judgment of the proper application of international
comity to a given case undermines the United Phosphorus ap-
proach.292 As previously mentioned above, international comity is not
relevant to a court's decision in finding subject matter jurisdiction. 293
As writer of the Steel Co. majority opinion, Scalia held that a plain-
tiff's nonfrivilous allegations establish a district court's prescriptive ju-
risdiction.2 94 International comity may limit a court's power to decide
a case only if such exercise would be unreasonable in light of the de-
fendant's connections to a foreign jurisdiction.2 95 But this part of Jus-
tice Scalia's Hartford dissent surfaced nowhere in the United
Phosphorus majority.296 Even if this analysis were to apply to the
facts in United Phosphorus, international comity would not prevent
exercise of jurisdiction because the defendants never alleged that their
legal and commercial connections to another sovereign made exercise
of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction unreasonable. 297 Reasonableness
should ultimately take into account U.S. interests in balancing deter-
rence, robust U.S. export commerce, and international comity. This
290. Id. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987)). Justice Scalia expanded upon what "unreasona-
ble" means:
The "reasonableness" inquiry turns on a number of factors including, but not limited to:
"the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory [of the regulating
state]," "the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regu-
lated, "the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted," "the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity," and "the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by another state."
Hartford, 509 U.S. at 818-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
291. Id. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the Hartford majority
should have deferred to the interests of the United Kingdom. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
295. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 819-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 942-53. Interestingly, the United Phosphorus dissent
stated that, based on passages from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, prescrip-
tive jurisdiction would be satisfied if the FTAIA effects test were met and application of jurisdic-
tion would be unreasonable. Id. at 961 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415(3) and comment b thereto). Wood
argued that prescriptive jurisdiction was the issue before Congress in passing the FTAIA. Id. at
961-62 (Wood, J., dissenting). However, courts of appeals, until now, had never held that courts
were stripped of their jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 962 (Wood, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 942-53.
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weighing of factors, however, would best be addressed in a trial on the
merits and not on a preliminary motion to establish jurisdiction.
Therefore, the United Phosphorus approach to limiting subject matter
jurisdiction based on comity concerns ignores the Supreme Court's
more detailed, prescriptive comity analysis, which is better left to
plaintiff's burden in a trial on the merits.
3. The United Phosphorus Majority's Reliance on Case Law Prior
to Passage of the FTAIA Is Misguided
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of the "extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. antitrust law" before Congress enacted the
FTAIA.298 But the relevance of pre-FTAIA rulings to the interpreta-
tion of subsequent statutory law is suspect because Congress passed
the Act with the intent to clarify the standards by which courts would
find subject matter jurisdiction over conduct arising outside of the ter-
ritorial borders of the United States. 299 Therefore, Seventh Circuit
decisions prior to passage of the FTAIA are irrelevant because the
determination of the proper "extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-
trust law" rests solely on interpreting the FTAIA. 3°°
C. Whether Congress Meant to Jurisdictionally Strip Federal Courts
of Their Authority to Hear Such Matters
As the Den Norske court noted, "Legislative history is relegated to
a secondary source behind the language of the statute in determining
congressional intent; even in its secondary role legislative history must
be used cautiously. '30 1 The FTAIA's legislative history is inconclusive
as to whether it limits the court's ability to hear a plaintiff's claim.
The legislative history of the FTAIA illustrates how Congress tried
"to resolve ambiguity regarding the extraterritorial application of
American antitrust law."'302 The FTAIA's purpose was to "more
298. Id. at 949; see also sources cited supra note 9.
299. In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the Seventh Circuit approached the "extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. antitrust law" in a two-pronged manner: First, it asked whether subject
matter jurisdiction existed, and second, it asked whether it "should... be exercised." Id. at 949
(citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)); see also sources cited
supra note 9. The Seventh Circuit's broad approach in the second prong of this old test in
deciding whether to exert jurisdiction highlights a predisposed policy bias in favor of interna-
tional comity in interpreting the FTAIA.
300. See sources cited supra note 9. The Court in Empagran held that pre-FTAIA cases were
insignificant for purposes of interpreting the extraterritorial limitations provided by the Sherman
Act and the FTAIA. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2371 (2004).
301. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 428 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988)).
302. See Note, supra note 3, at 2136 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 5).
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clearly establish when antitrust liability attaches to international busi-
ness activities ... [and to establish] the precise legal standard to be
employed in determining whether American antitrust law is to be ap-
plied to a particular transaction. ' 30 3 The drafters of the F-AIA also
sought to encourage export trade, thus exempting purely foreign
transactions from the scope of U.S. antitrust laws.
3°4
Of principal importance is the statute's "effects" test.305 The
FTAIA's legislative history provides that "[t]he intent of the Sherman
and [Federal Tort Claims] Act amendments in H.R. 5235 is to exempt
from the antitrust laws conduct that does not have the requisite do-
mestic effects. ' 30 6 Although the statute refers to "conduct" generally,
without emphasizing the geographical origin of the conduct, the stat-
ute focuses on the location of the effects.307 This result "circum-
scribe[s] narrowly the subset of foreign purchasers who could be
understood to have the necessary standing to maintain such claims"
while extending "subject matter jurisdiction broadly. ' 308
Although legislators intended to clarify the circumstances by which
plaintiffs could sue under the Sherman Act, no language from the leg-
islative history suggests that the drafters intended that the FTAIA's
303. See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 5-8).
304. See Dzara, supra note 9, at 432. In discussing the Court's analysis in Den Norske, Dzara
wrote that Judge Higginbotham emphasized the importance of the FTAIA, in conjunction with
the Export Trading Company Act, in easing restrictions on export commerce to increase Ameri-
can competitiveness overseas. Id. at 431. The latter act states that its purpose is to make "more
efficient provision of export trade services to United States producers and suppliers ... by...
modifying the application of the antitrust laws to certain export trade." Id. Moreover, the Dis-
trict Court in In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation aptly reviewed legislative history by iden-
tifying how the two goals of the FTAIA relate. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 127 F.
Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Md. 2001). The court noted that the Act endeavored to loosen restrictions
on exporters and clarify the standard by which U.S. courts would assert jurisdiction over foreign
conduct. Id. The court argued that Congress foresaw such a dual intention, and it meant to open
the dockets to foreign plaintiffs. Id. The court cited House Report No. 97-686:
The intent of the Sherman and FTCA Act amendments in H.R. 5235 is to exempt from
the antitrust laws conduct that does not have the requisite domestic effects. This test,
however, does not exclude all persons injured abroad from recovering under the anti-
trust laws of the United States. A course of conduct in the United States-e.g., price
fixing not limited to the export market-would affect all purchasers of the target prod-
ucts or services, whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic. The conduct has the
requisite effects within the United States, even if some purchasers take title abroad or
suffer economic injury abroad. Foreign purchasers should enjoy the protection of our
antitrust laws in the domestic marketplace, just as our citizens do. Indeed, to deny
them this protection could violate the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties
this country has entered into with a number of foreign nations.
Id. (citations omitted).
305. See generally Dzara, supra note 9.
306. Note, supra note 3, at 2140 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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"effects" test acts as a jurisdictional prerequisite to allowing a district
court to hear the case on the merits.
V. IMPACT: UNITED PHOSPHORUS UNDERMINES THE ROLE AND
IMPORTANCE OF DETERRENCE IN ANTITRUST LAW
By requiring district courts to make factual findings of the requisite
"effects on U.S. commerce" 30 9 before finding U.S. subject matter ju-
risdiction, the United Phosphorus majority's approach threatens to de-
crease the number of international antitrust claims heard in U.S.
courts.31 0 It may also discourage claimants from bringing potentially
successful suits that would not only compensate plaintiffs, but would
also benefit U.S. consumers by preventing future abuses. This out-
come, coupled with the misapplied premium that the United Phos-
phorus majority placed on international comity, deemphasizes, or
even ignores, the role deterrence should play in courts' decisions.
This section calls on courts to value deterrence as the fundamental
policy in interpreting the FTAIA.
A. Federal Circuit Dissenting Opinions Emphasize Various Aspects
of Deterrence Policies
In its concluding remarks, the United Phosphorus dissent noted that
the majority's subject matter jurisdiction approach, which required
factual findings of "effects" on U.S. commerce before proceeding to
the merits, stood to impede the DOJ's efforts to halt illegal interna-
309. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952.
310. The decision also remains stable in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 124 S. Ct. 533 (2003).
Courts following the Seventh Circuit United Phosphorus decision hold it to mean that district
courts may, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), look beyond the face of the com-
plaint to examine the substance of the allegations. See Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418,
424-25 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Blevins-Moore v. B. Barnhart, No. 1:03-CV-13, 2003 WL
21919180, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2003). District courts have held United Phosphorus to articu-
late two types of 12(b)(1) motions: "those that attack the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allega-
tions and those that attack the factual basis for jurisdiction." See Franklin Lunding v. Biocatalyst
Res., Inc., No. 03 C 696, 2003 WL 21310280, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2003). Motions that attack
the sufficiency of an allegation "are subject to the same standard" as motions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In factual challenges, "the [c]ourt may consider affidavits
and other evidence in deciding the motion." Id. In both situations the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof. Id. A court "is free to weigh the evidence" in deciding whether subject matter jurisdic-
tion is proper. See Qualitech Steel Corp. v. GE Supply Co., 1102-0040-CMS, 2003 WL 21314073,
at *11 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2003). "Factual findings rendered during this process are reviewed for
clear error." Id. (citing United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946); see also Purmal v. Supreme Court
of Illinois, No. 03 C 458, 2004 WL 542528, at *2 (N.D. IIl. Feb. 26, 2004); Bogacz v. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 03 C 4548, 2003 WL 22057026 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2003); Maton v. Comm'r of Internal Reve-
nue, No. 02 C 6689, 2003 WL 1860514, at *2 (N.D. I1. Apr. 10, 2003); El-Khader v. Perryman,
264 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648-49 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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tional cartels.311 Unsurprisingly, the United Phosphorus dissent is not
the only dissent in a major federal appellate court opinion to invoke a
deterrence policy argument in interpreting the scope of the FTAIA.
Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Den Norske, which involved the cir-
cuit split eventually resolved in Empagran, argued that private suits
aid the DOJ's efforts to curtail international cartels.312 Judge Higgin-
botham mentioned the role of the Clayton Act in conjunction with the
Sherman Act in "enlist[ing] private enforcement in supplementation
of governmental enforcement of the Sherman Act. ' 313 Emphasizing
the role of deterrence in protecting market efficiency, Judge Higgin-
botham argued that the majority's interpretation would impede the
purposes of the FTAIA and reduce the efficacy of U.S. antitrust
laws.314 He wrote, "Nothing in the text of the FTAIA, or the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982 as a whole, or its legislative history,
casts doubt on the importance of deterring restraints of trade that af-
fect United States commerce.' ' 315 He noted that the Supreme Court
has often recognized that "the accent of the Sherman and the Clayton
Acts is deterrence, requiring violators to pay full, treble damages,
even if some plaintiffs gain a windfall or are foreigners. ' 316 Admitting
the inelegance of the FTAIA, Judge Higginbotham wrote that the
311. The holding would at a minimum impede the Justice Department's efforts in the Seventh
Circuit because it might lead to forum shopping as the dissent forewarned. See United Phos-
phorus, 322 F.3d at 964.
312. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 433 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham wrote in full "[t]hat an
injury that 'gives rise to' an antitrust claim must be an injury caused by harm to competition is no
light notion." Id. at 432-33 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Continuing, he argued that "[the
requisite injury to competition] is a well established and fundamental tenet of antitrust law ....
[Antitrust injury] is frequently encountered in enforcement action under the Clayton Act, by
which Congress enlisted private enforcement in supplementation of governmental enforcement
of the Sherman Act." Id. at 433 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Judge Higginbotham poignantly described the complementary nature of the two acts. Id.
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). While the Clayton Act requires that the plaintiff suffer an in-
jury, the FTAIA demands only that the U.S. suffer an injury. Id. at 453 n.7 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting). Judge Higginbotham wrote: "When a private plaintiff wishes to sue under the Clay-
ton Act, the Clayton Act and FrAIA erect complementary requirements: the plaintiff must suf-
fer antitrust injury, and persons in United States commerce must suffer antitrust injury. The
majority opinion, on the other hand, appears to conflate these two concepts." Den Norske, 241
F.3d at 433 n.7 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 434 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
316. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). He noted that the Court in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, recognized the importance of "vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust
laws" and "deterring violators." Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois Brick Co., 431
U.S. 720 (1977)). The court observed that "'from the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to
whom damages are paid, so long as [someone] redresses the violation."' Id. at 434 (Higginbot-
ham, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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amending statute stands to enforce "selfish" U.S. interests by exclud-
ing wrongful conduct that has no effect on U.S. commerce. 317 How-
ever, the FTAIA "enlists all injured parties-foreign or domestic-to
assist the Department of Justice in deterring conduct" that injures
U.S. competition. 318 Judge Higginbotham discusses the deterrent
force private parties bring to bear in applying U.S. antitrust law:
When a conspiracy causes a direct and substantial injury to competi-
tion in the United States, the Clayton Act recruits private parties to
supplement the efforts of the Department of Justice in ending the
conspiracy. The FTAIA ensures that parties injured by foreign as-
pects of the same conspiracy that harms American commerce are
part of the phalanx of enforcers brought to bear by the Clayton Act.
Thus, treble damages suits by parties who suffer antitrust injury
from a conspiracy that has a direct and substantial harmful impact
on United States commerce serve a single function: the protection
of United States commerce. The FTAIA threatens no parade of
horribles-it does nothing more than zealously protect competition
in the United States while sparing from the docket of American
courts suits involving conspiracies that affect only foreign
economies. 319
Ironically, the U.S. amicus brief in Empagran320 challenged the ar-
gument that narrow interpretations of the FFAIA undermine the
DOJ's efforts to prosecute international cartels.321 The United States
argued that allowing private-party standing for injuries that occurred
abroad threatens the vibrancy of the DOJ's amnesty program. 322 This
amnesty program allows corporate entities to seek full amnesty before
an investigation of the cartel commences. 323 Allowing private parties
to sue these cooperating entities for treble damages for wrongful con-
duct that occurred anywhere on the globe would discourage cooperat-
ing entities or individuals from seeking the protection that the
amnesty program provides. 324 The DOJ argued that a weakened am-
nesty program would cripple its abilities to identify and prosecute in-
ternational cartels. 325 The Supreme Court found that the evidence
317. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 438-39 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 439 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
319. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
320. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2372 (2004).
321. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 963-64 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Wood, J., dissenting).
322. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the United States at *20, Empagran, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (No. 03-
724), 2004 WL 234125.
323. Id. at *19-20.
324. Id. at *20-21.
325. Id. at *21. William E. Kovacic also discusses the same issue raised by the United States's
amicus brief in Empagran. See William E. Kovacic, Sauce for the Gander: Foreign Extraterrito-
rial Regulation of U.S. Parties, Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence in International
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was unclear and of empirical insignificance in light of its analysis.
326
But the Court did not reject deterrence generally.327 Nor did the
court hold that international comity trumps deterrence.
328
B. Legal Commentators Emphasize the Importance of Deterrence
as a Preeminent U.S. Antitrust Policy
In addition to these dissenting opinions, other commentators have
provided persuasive arguments for extending latitude to private law-
suits in helping the DOJ deter wrongdoers. Professor Salil Mehra
cites statistical evidence that the private lawsuit has aided antitrust
enforcement because private access to treble damages "creates the in-
centive for that assistance. '32 9 Mehra highlights that "private parties
... have .. .unique access to information crucial to public enforce-
ment."330 Moreover, she argues that the DOJ owes a debt of grati-
tude to the convincing deterrent that the prospect of treble damages
brings to bear.331 She concludes that it is reasonable to allow parties
to sue in U.S. courts, even if it causes tensions with other countries, as
Competition Policy, 97 Am. Soc'Y INT'L PROC. 309, 311 (2003). When a cartel member debates
cooperating with antitrust authorities, he assesses potential damages to private claimants. Id. at
311 n.9. Such forecasting to foreign parties using U.S. courts is uncertain and exacerbated by
broad applications of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. This effect deters wrongdoers from seeking
leniency, thus delaying the detection of illegal practices. Id. For a discussion of leniency pro-
grams, see Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting
Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798 (2001).
326. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2372 (2004).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Mehra, supra note 89, at 320. In support of this proposition, Professor Mehra summa-
rized statistical evidence of Harry First, who studied the effects on state enforcement of antitrust
law in Japan where no private remedy existed. Id. His study found that the Japanese absence of
a private remedy in practice and the greater resources of private plaintiffs "marks the most
significant difference between the level of antitrust enforcement" between the United States and
Japan. Id. at 320 n.164 (citation omitted). He predicted that "[c]ritical to the viability of anti-
trust in Japan [in the future] will be the private cause of action." Id. (citation omitted). Refer-
ring to the statistical findings of Stephen Caulkins, Professor Mehra concluded that antitrust
class actions will continue to play a vital role in deterring conduct that falls short of triggering
criminal liability but that merit condemnation nonetheless. Id.
330. Id.
331. Mehra, supra note 89, at 321.
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long as it deters wrongful conduct.332 This perspective emphasizes de-
terrence over international comity concerns. 333
Mehra, in another article supporting deterrence-based antitrust
polices, specifically suggests that courts should "look to policy in a
more in-depth fashion" where statutory text and legislative history
wander.334 She argues that the private-plaintiff-deterrent adds poten-
tial costs to violators and aids government agencies, "thus providing a
force-multiplier to those agencies' own resources. '335 Mehra also dis-
cusses steps the European Union (EU) has taken to find "private al-
lies."' 336 Not only has the EU adopted a regulation providing that
private parties may enforce EU competition law in national courts,
but it has also created an amnesty program that provides conspirators
with incentives to reveal information about co-conspirators, similar to
a DOJ program adopted in 1993. 33 7 United Phosphorus threatens to
undermine the deterrent potency of the Sherman Act under which
"private citizens will have the treble damage incentive under United
States law to reach out and help United States enforcement
agencies." 338
Mehra also argues that statutory "effects-based" versus territorial
approaches make "jurisdictional overlap" in the antitrust arena work-
332. Id. She also concludes that while rejection of international comity concerns in Hartford
might anger our trading partners, the consequence of such a broader reading of the FTAIA
might help these foreigners. Id. She surmised: "a broader reading of the FTAIA may benefit
our trading partners' plaintiffs to the extent that they complain of conduct with U.S. effects, and
to the extent that U.S. remedies are more generous... [this] might be seen as a logical extension
of Hartford." Id.
333. But Professor Mehra also quoted other authors who present opposing views. Kenneth
Dam found that while Hartford permits "private attorney generals" to facilitate U.S. economic
policy decisionmaking replete of judicial oversight and safeguards, calling the courts to "impose
standards" to prevent abuse and assure beneficial consideration of the public interest. Id. at 320
n.163 (quoting Kenneth Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire
Case, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 289, 328). She also quoted Hannah L. Buxbaum: "[Buxbaum ob-
served] that '[a]fter Hartford .... actions by a federal agency are subject to interest-balancing
[by the agency internally under its guidelines] while actions brought by private attorneys gen-
eral-in service of the same public interests-are not."' Id. (quoting Hannah L. Buxbaum, The
Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Liti-
gation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 234 (2001)).
334. See Mehra, supra note 89, at 774.
335. Id. at 770.
336. Id. According to findings of Harry First, Professor Mehra concludes that private plain-
tiffs "piggyback" off DOJ prosecutions and often gather evidence for their suits before govern-
ment agencies enter the scene. For example, one private plaintiff's counsel gathered evidence on
an international vitamin cartel before the government impaneled a grand jury. Id. (citing Harry
First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 712-13 (2001)).
337. Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
338. Id.
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able.339 She further contends, "When conduct occurs in one nation
with effects in another-or when effects occur in multiple nations-
the widespread acceptance of the effects test means that several na-
tions' antitrust regimes may apply concurrently. ' 340 Acceptance of a
multiple jurisdictional landscape should vitiate many international
comity concerns. 341
But overlapping jurisdiction may have negative consequences. An-
drew Stanger comments that overly broad U.S. antitrust jurisdiction
causes other countries to widen their jurisdiction in retaliation. 342
This resulting "myriad of contradictory laws" 343 injures U.S. economic
interests by stifling business transactions and increasing the costs of
regulating anticompetitive conduct. 344 The failed General Electric/
Honeywell merger in 2001 provides a good example.345 Some coun-
tries have adopted "blocking statutes" and other laws that invalidate
U.S. judgments or hinder litigation in U.S. courts. 346
339. Mehra, supra note 89, at 772.
340. Id. Professor Mehra notes division among scholars over whether concurrent jurisdiction
is more efficient than allocating exclusive jurisdiction to one country. Id. The prevailing inter-
pretation of the three-way circuit split will control the degree to which private antitrust suits will
remain possible in overlapping jurisdictions. Id. Professor Mehra discusses two reasons for this
result: (1) If the restrictive interpretation prevails, then government agencies might have wider
jurisdiction under the effects approach than private plaintiffs because they will only have to
show an effect on U.S. commerce and will not have to demonstrate an injury; (2) if other juris-
dictions permitting private suits adopt a similar effects test, then jurisdiction would be appor-
tioned to the country where such effects occurred. Id. With respect to the second, "[ais a result,
reciprocal adoption of this test could eliminate overlap, and eliminate competition of antitrust
law regimes, with respect to private rights of action." Id. at 773.
341. Mehra, supra note 89, at 772.
342. See Andrew Stanger, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Foreign Parties After
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1453, 1454.
343. Id. at 1454.
344. See Kovacic, supra note 325, at 311.
345. Id. at 310. While the DOJ approved the merger, the EU asserted jurisdiction and found
the merger illegal. Stanger, supra note 342, at 1454-55 n.7 (citation omitted).
346. "Blocking statutes" curtail the discovery process by criminalizing the production of docu-
ments for U.S. trials. See Stanger, supra note 342, at 1455 n.8 (citing RALPH H. FOSOM ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 20.14 (2d ed. 2002)). For example, the United
Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 inhibits the deposition of witnesses, the
obtaining of documents, and the enforcement of punitive awards. Id.
While Stanger notes concerns of overlapping jurisdictional problems, he later endorses the
Empagran interpretation over the narrow Den Norske approach because the former "maximizes
the deterrent effect of the FTAIA by allowing plaintiffs injured outside of the United States to
bring suit." Id. at 1487.
Related to this issue of overlapping jurisdiction is the debate over whether international or
national institutions ought to govern antitrust disputes. For an interesting exploration of the
dichotomy between "horizontalism" (where antitrust law is enforced by many nations) and inter-
nationalism (where one supranational institution governs antitrust disputes), see Eleanor M.
Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911 (2003).
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Writing on the circuit split over the meaning of "a claim," Ryan
Haas argued in favor of deterrence reminiscent of Senator Sherman,
who, by authoring the Sherman Act, sought to protect the more vul-
nerable from "great aggregations of capital. ' 347 Haas advocated that
amidst rising poverty rates and decreasing median income levels "the
need to protect consumers from conspiracies is even more press-
ing."' 348 Ideally, Haas would prefer that an international organization
such as the World Trade Organization or the United Nations harmo-
nize international antitrust policy and create enforcement mecha-
nisms.349 In the meantime, he supports a broader reading of the
FTAIA that "better serves the deterrence purpose[s] of antitrust law
without violating international law . . . better deters anticompetitive
conduct across the board ... [and] better protects American consum-
ers from the harmful effects of international cartels. ' 350 Although dif-
ficulties arise in enforcing U.S. judgments abroad, and vice-versa,
Haas surmises that these judgments should be enforceable because
"there is little justification for price-fixing or output-limiting private
cartels."'351 He adds that "[i]f U.S. law cannot protect American con-
sumers from foreign conduct that raises the prices of oil and gasoline,
or perhaps even necessities, such as food or clothing, then consumers
may be at the mercy of the monopolistic whim of international corpo-
rate cartels. '352
But one author argues that the FTAIA endeavored to deter wrong-
ful conduct and stimulate American export activities. 353 According to
this author, U.S. policy should not protect international competition
for its own sake in international trade. 354 U.S. policies should reflect
that times have changed: "Nineteenth-century populist concern for
347. Note, supra note 3, at 2125 n.21 (quoting HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1954)); see Haas, supra note 9, at
123.
348. Haas, supra note 9, at 123.
349. Id. at 122.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 123.
352. Id. Haas argues that until the world is ready to harmonize international competition
policy, "consumers must be protected from the effects of such harmful and unfair activity as the
formation of anticompetitive cartels." Id. at 124. He concludes that the Second Circuit ap-
proach, requiring that "a" claim of the plaintiff not be tied to the "effects" on U.S. commerce,
provides U.S. consumers with the most efficacious form of antitrust protection. Haas, supra note
9, at 124.
353. Note, supra note 3, at 2145.
354. Id. at 2143. This viewpoint potentially conflicts with a reading of Haas' argument that
antitrust wrongdoing is inherently undesirable. See Haas, supra note 9, at 123. One could read
the commentator's note to argue that the FTAIA implicitly encourages anticompetitive activity
that does not have the requisite effects on U.S. commerce. See Note, supra note 3, at 2144.
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the vulnerability of the individual American before the concentrated
power of U.S. firms arguably has been tempered by recognition of
potential vulnerability in the face of concentrated foreign economic
power. ' 355 Encouraging competitive U.S. businesses, and not compe-
tition for its own sake, should inform application of U.S. antitrust laws
to foreign trade.356
Deterrence should be the paramount maxim in interpreting anti-
trust laws. Tempering our laws with concern for competitiveness and
international comity serve to check, but not override antitrust law's
predominant interest in preventing wrongful commercial practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
From an analytical standpoint, the United Phosphorus decision has
tenuous textual, precedential, and legislative history support. Yet, the
decision's salient policy preference of international comity appears
timely in light of the Supreme Court's about-face in Empagran, which
gave international comity a major role in its FTAIA interpretation.35 7
Although deterrence is perhaps outweighed by other considerations,
including international comity, in addressing the issues raised in Em-
pagran, deterrence should remain the foremost antitrust policy.
Before deciding Empagran, the Supreme Court waited until three
circuits disagreed over the proper interpretation of "a claim." Only
when other circuits reject the Seventh Circuit approach, perhaps on
deterrence grounds, will the Supreme Court use prescriptive comity
principles to decide whether the FTAIA "strip[s] federal district
courts of their competence to hear and decide antitrust cases with a
foreign element. '358
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356. Id.
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